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The 2018 Race for Governor of Illinois: Rauner vs. Pritzker 
Introduction 
The 2018 race for governor in Illinois was unique in the annuals of the state and 
nation.  For the first time ever it featured two mega-rich candidates vying for a 
job that pays $177,412 per year.  Between the candidates, Bruce Rauner, the 
incumbent Republican, and the challenger, J. B. Pritzker, the two campaign 
committees spent a combined total of $251.7 million dollars on the race and 
support for other allied candidates, making it the most expensive governor’s race 
in Illinois history. This race came close to surpassing the national record of 
Governor Jerry Brown vs. Meg Whitman in California in 2010 who spent between 
them, $280 million in a state which is three times larger than Illinois. A very large 
proportion of the total on both sides was provided by contributions from the 
candidates themselves (Madhani, November 2, 2018; Miller, January 16, 2019, 1; 
See also: https://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/D2Quarterly.aspx?). 
This paper describes and analyzes how these two quite different former 
businessmen, both of whom had vast personal resources, fought each other and 
the opposition party with their personal fortunes and what that shift in candidate 
recruitment and campaign funding has already meant for the Republican party 
and may mean for the future for the Democratic Party and the state of Illinois.   
The Candidates and the Campaign 
J. B. Pritzker 
J. B. Pritzker was the second very rich challenger to take on an incumbent Illinois 
governor in the last two election cycles with Bruce Rauner being the first in 2014.  
While Rauner’s fortune was measured in the hundreds of millions, Pritzker’s was 
measured in the billions.  Pritzker was so wealthy he could say to Rauner, “I will 
see your tens of millions funding your campaign and helping your party, and I 
raise you by whatever it takes for mine”. Near the end it was reported that 
Rauner had spent a total of $95.3 million he had donated to his campaign fund 
since he got into politics in 2013 with his most recent contribution having been 
$50 million in December 2016. The wealthiest man in Illinois, Ken Griffin, had 
added an additional $20 million to Rauner’s campaign war chest.  Pritzker had 
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spent over $146 million of his own personal funds near the end of the race. (Rich 
Miller, Capitol Fax, October 1, 2018).  
Pritzker inherited a fortune from his family who became very wealthy through the 
Hyatt Hotel chain as the cornerstone of their wealth.  The family resources were 
so large that when it came time for the second generation to divide up the 
fortune, after a protracted family fight, several became billionaires from the 
proceeds.  Some of the Pritzkers were Democrats and some were Republicans.      
J. B. was a Democrat, but also a venture capitalist and private equity fund owner 
who parlayed his inherited fortune into even more billions from his own 
management and investments.  He was well-known and active in Chicago 
business circles. He and his wife were also prominent philanthropists who had 
made major donations to various charities and non-profits in the Chicago area.  
This included the Northwestern University School of Law to whom they gave $100 
million in 2015, a Holocaust Museum and Educational Center in Skokie, and the 
Pritzker Consortium for Early Childhood Development at the University of 
Chicago, a non-profit which specialized in trying to improve early childhood 
education and the feeding of disadvantaged young people which he claimed 
helped feed more than 230,000 school children. Pritzker also founded and funded 
the 1871 a start-up innovation center in Chicago which his campaign claimed had 
already created 8,000 new high tech jobs (Jackson County Democrats, September, 
2018, Meyer, October 5, 2018; Madhani, November 2, 2018). 
As a wealthy businessman and philanthropist, Pritzker was also involved in politics 
in Chicago and Washington.  After receiving his undergraduate degree from Duke 
University, Pritzker worked on the staff of two U. S. Senators, Terry Sanford of 
North Carolina and Alan Dixon of Illinois.  After an early defeat in a Democratic 
primary in the 9th congressional district in Illinois soon after receiving a law degree 
from Northwestern, he considered running for other public offices on several 
prior occasions and he also advised prominent state and national politicians.  
 His interactions with former Governor Rod Blagojevich, got him into trouble 
when their phone conversation was recorded by a FBI wire-tap on Blagojevich, 
who was under investigation at the time. The recordings captured Pritzker 
discussing various prominent African-American leaders who Blagojevich was 
considering as replacements in the U. S. Senate seat held by Barack Obama. In 
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January of 2009, Governor Blagojevich was impeached by the General Assembly, 
removed from office and then sentenced to 14 years in federal prison for 
influence peddling and trying to sell the senate seat.  All of this became a part of 
the 2018 campaign context, and provided plenty of fodder for Governor Rauner’s 
thousands of attack ads against Pritzker.   
Bruce Rauner 
Bruce Rauner was ranked by Forbes to be a half billionaire when he won the 
governorship in 2014 as the first extraordinarily wealthy candidate in Illinois 
history to win the office.  An earlier paper which I wrote on that election (Jackson, 
January, 2015) noted that at the time Rauner epitomized the growing trend for 
very wealthy candidates to emerge from the business community and use their 
wealth to plunge into American politics at the very top echelons of elite public 
offices, including governor, senator, and then in 2016, president of the United 
States.  When Rauner was elected he became one of twelve governors across the 
United States who had turned their wealth into access to the top office in their 
states.  Most of those had not held previous public office of any type which marks 
a significant change in the way potential candidates are recruited, or self-
nominated.   
Rauner beat the then incumbent, Pat Quinn, who had been in state politics for his 
entire adult life. Quinn took the traditional route to the governor’s office as he 
worked his way up through the ranks of various elected and appointed lower 
offices, including Commissioner of the Cook County Board of Property Tax 
Appeals, Revenue Director for the City of Chicago, State Treasurer, and Lt. 
Governor before gaining the top rung (Illinois Blue Book, 2013-2014, 21).  
In 2009 Quinn was elevated to the governor’s office once his predecessor Rod 
Blagojevich was impeached and convicted (Sierachi, 2009).  He won election to a 
full term in November of 2010 when he beat Republican State Senator Bill Brady 
in a hard fought and close race by only 31,832 votes, or less than one percent of 
the total (Jackson, January, 2011).  Quinn’s route to the top was fairly typical for 
those who have been professional politicians for most of their careers and who 
have had the diverse array of experiences and training that comes from having 




Those professional politicians, like Pat Quinn, go through a long recruitment, 
political socialization and civic education process regarding how the system 
works, who their allies and opponents are, and what are the issues and policies 
they will need to be conversant with in order to continue to climb the electoral 
ladder.  These experiences make them seasoned veterans, even before they reach 
the top and teach them to understand the powers and limits of their office, and 
all those they share power with, and how to wield power as they negotiate the 
labyrinth of state and federal politics.   
Bruce Rauner was a quite different type of candidate compared to Pat Quinn.  He 
epitomizes the new breed of business-man-turned-politician, a type which is 
increasingly finding success in the rough and tumble of American politics.  We are 
in an era now when repeated presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional 
elections have been dominated by the battle-cry that the nation, or state, needs 
an “Outsider” to clean up politics or “drain the swamp”. This has meant that being 
a professional politician is now considered to be a major liability rather than a 
mark of competence achieved by a candidate who has worked in and studied the 
system and learned how the vastly complicated state and national political 
systems really work and how to get things done in Springfield or Washington.   
Bruce Rauner’s Record 
In 2018 Rauner was, of course, the incumbent governor of Illinois seeking a 
second term.  In this respect the roles were reversed from his first election in 
2014 when he was the outsider running to unseat a wounded Democrat, Pat 
Quinn.  This time Rauner had his own record to defend, and that record, and his 
management of the government of Illinois became the top issue in the campaign, 
much as it had been in the Quinn vs. Rauner campaign of 2014.   
Otherwise, the similarities between Pritzker in 2018 and Rauner in 2014 were 
striking. Neither of them had ever held public office before, and both of them 
were very rich businessmen who wanted to start a new career at the top of the 
political ladder.  In this background they are the epitome of this whole new breed 
of very rich people (mostly men) who decided to leave the private sector and seek 
a second career in the public sector in their middle age years.   
Rauner lived in Winnetka then, one of the most expensive suburbs of north shore 
Chicago.  He was purported to own eight private residencies scattered throughout 
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the U. S. and if he won the race, the governor’s mansion in Springfield would 
become his ninth place to call home.  He promised to move to Springfield if 
elected, and he made good on this promise although it was almost two years into 
his term before renovations to the governor’s mansion became complete and he 
and his family were able to move into a building that had been in serious need for 
major repair for decades. Rauner promised to get the mansion renovated and to 
get it done with private funds. This was one promise he kept, with assistance from 
the governor and his wife, and J. B Pritzker and his wife all of whom made 
significant personal donations to the building fund supporting the renovation. 
As he promised during the campaign, Rauner attempted to govern like he ran his 
business. That is, instead of participating in the give-and take of negotiating with 
others and learning the art of compromise and understanding that he could not 
just give commands and expect to have everyone take his commands as marching 
orders, he had to work with others in his own party, and in the other party, which 
controlled the General Assembly to get them to reach a mutually agreeable 
position they could all live with. Rauner as governor staked out firm positions 
which advanced his political agenda, especially the Turnaround Agenda, and then 
refused to compromise or to give much quarter especially to the General 
Assembly when they failed to act on or pass much of his program. When the 
governor’s bills failed to pass he attacked the General Assembly and especially the 
legislative leaders loudly and personally, decrying state politics as broken and the 
as leadership corrupt. Frequently Illinois was faced with governmental gridlock 
when not much real policy got passed and conflict between the executive and 
legislative branches sank to historic depths during Rauner’s term (Leonard, May 
2017).   
Divided government, with the Republicans controlling the executive branch under 
Rauner, and the Democrats controlling the legislative branch under Speaker of 
the House, Michael J. Madigan, and President of the Senate, John Cullerton, led to 
a two year gridlock over the budget which is one of the most fundamental 
functions (along with public safety and national defense) state and federal 
governments must perform.     
That failure to adopt a state budget for two consecutive fiscal years meant that 
the state had a budget process that had broken down and that essential function 
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of the state was taken over by a series of ad hoc administrative decisions, court 
rulings and one time only “stopgap” appropriations that kept the government 
going but which caused great uncertainty and long-term damage.  This period of 
chaotic rule did enormous damage to state agencies and the clients they serve, 
especially in the human services areas.  It also deeply damaged the state’s once 
premier system of higher education with wounds that will take years if not 
decades to overcome. 
The budgetary impasse was ultimately broken midway through 2017 when the 
General Assembly overrode Governor Rauner’s veto of the budget that the 
legislators had passed earlier.  That veto was overridden by the vote of almost all 
of the Democrats and ten Republican legislators in the House and one in the 
Senate. Finally the state had a budget which included in its base a five billion 
dollar tax increase which was built in as necessary to achieve an almost balanced 
budget for FY2017 and then essentially repeated for FY2018. 
All this conflict and chaos was the backdrop against which the 2018 elections 
played out.  The gridlock period was particularly relevant because it was an 
inescapable part of the record of Governor Rauner who had to bear the onus of 
being a key player in that recent history.  Not surprisingly, as the incumbent 
governor, Bruce Rauner was forced to defend his record during the campaign.  His 
opponent, J. B. Pritzker, repeatedly called him a “failed governor” who had 
proven incapable of managing the state.  That charge was ironic since it was the 
exact same charge that Rauner hurled repeatedly against the then-incumbent, Pat 
Quinn, when he defeated Quinn in 2014.   
The Rauner and Pritzker cases were strikingly similar in some respects.  Rauner 
was a very rich businessman when he first ran, with an annual income well over 
one hundred million dollars according to reports filed with the Secretary of State’s 
office.   While he was not a multi-billionaire like Pritzker, he was nevertheless very 
well off by comparison with the average voter.  
This extraordinary wealth may have caused him to overdramatize his attempts to 
try to appear to be just an ordinary citizen who could identify with and 
communicate with more ordinary people.  His formal and informal speech after 
he was elected often took on a pattern of ostentatiously dropping of the “g” at 
the end of many words. Commentators doing post mortems on his State of the 
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State and Budget addresses to the legislature frequently derided his somewhat 
affected speech patterns.  They likewise derided his penchant for wearing what 
he must have thought were ordinary guy clothes especially when he was away 
from Springfield or Chicago. The Carhartt work jackets became his signature 
apparel, and the butt of numerous jokes by political commentators. None of this 
would have constituted more than just individual idiocrasies except for the fact 
that it became a part of a public persona that helped critics to question the 
honesty and genuineness of the governor, his ability to communicate with 
average voters and just how closely his public image reflected his private life and 
value commitments. 
After winning in 2014 Governor Rauner wasted little time in effectively taking 
over the Republican Party organization. The governor of Illinois is the head of the 
executive branch and he has many jobs to fill, contracts to let, and ways he can 
help his friends and punish his enemies. To these advantages Rauner also used his 
personal wealth to engineer this take-over at the grassroots level in many 
counties especially by supporting candidates sympathetic to his cause. In addition 
he also threatened to put a candidate up against any recalcitrant legislators in the 
next primary.  This earned him considerable ill-will from some legislators, and 
deep enmity from others, like State Senator Sam McCann who did get a 
challenger in the 2016 Republican Primary in 2016 although he won. McCann then 
ran against Rauner in the 2018 general election and he attacked Rauner 
vigorously from the right in that race.     
The most controversial part of Rauner’s record, and the element which caused 
great controversy in his attempts to manage the state stemmed from his early 
introduction of a set of revolutionary programmatic proposals for Illinois which he 
termed “The Turnaround Agenda” (Leonard, May 2017).  It originally included a 
total of forty-four policy changes which he said were absolutely necessary to 
address the state’s negative reputation, stabilize the budget, and put Illinois on 
the right track to reform and prosperity.  He promised that this plan would lead to 
a healthy state government, one which would attract new business and industry 
to Illinois, would stabilize its finances and stop the drain of people from the state.   
These proposals included: instituting term limits for legislators, taking the power 
over redistricting away from state legislators and giving it to an independent 
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commission, getting control of public pensions, reducing the income tax and 
property taxes, limiting the power of labor unions, particularly public employee 
unions, by curtailing their collective bargaining rights, eliminating the prevailing 
wage requirements on union contracts, creating “empowerment zones” at the 
discretion of local governing authorities where union power would be diminished, 
decreasing workers’ compensation rates in Illinois, and a number of other 
ancillary legal and constitutional proposals, all of which proved to be highly 
controversial.  Rauner was vigorously opposed by the state’s labor movement, 
and the unions who had supported Quinn only tepidly in 2014, mobilized and 
poured millions of dollars into their campaign to defeat Rauner, and to elect new 
legislators who would be supporters of union causes.   
In fact, the Turnaround Agenda, and Rauner’s strict adherence to his own 
priorities, most of which were rejected by the Democratically controlled General 
Assembly, and then his veto of two consecutive state budgets passed by the 
legislature produced gridlock in the making of state policy and significant 
uncertainty, and at times outright chaos,  in the management of state 
government.   
 By the end of his term, Rauner had reduced his focus on the Turnaround Agenda 
to a short list of major objectives, including term limits, property tax reductions, 
and limits on labor unions.  But by then, his political capital had been so depleted 
that he was unable to get any of the original Turnaround Agenda enacted, and 
Pritzker came into office with his own plan for the future of state government 
which he could start implementing when he took office in January of 2019.   
Rauner’s record in office, and Pritzker’s relationship to Speaker Madigan and both 
of the candidates’ use of their own private money enabled them to fund an 
extraordinarily divisive and mostly negative campaign for governor which 
promised to become the most expensive in the history of the country at the 
outset, a promise it lived up to in the end.   
The Primaries 
Before either candidate could face off in the general election, they had to win 
their own party’s nomination.  This turned out to be fairly easy for Pritzker and 
much harder for Rauner than had been anticipated. When it was over it was 
evident that Rauner’s close race and Pritzker’s surprisingly easy victory in the 
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Democratic Primary strengthened one and injured the other for the general 
election. A brief examination of the record of that primary race in March provides 
some useful clues as to the outcome of the fall campaign.   
As would ordinarily be expected for the out party, the Democratic primary field 
was a large one, totaling six in all.  However, only three of these were generally 
considered to be major contenders.  In addition to Pritzker, the three included 
Daniel Biss, a young and well-regarded State Senator, from Evanston.  Biss was 
originally a math professor at the University of Chicago before he got into state 
politics. He upheld the consistently and almost purely progressive end of the 
party’s ideological continuum. 
The other major primary candidate was Chris Kennedy, a real estate and 
investments businessman from Chicago, who had managed the Chicago 
Merchandise Mart for many years, and then more recently with his wife ran a 
non-profit, Top Box Foods, which addressed hunger problems. He was a scion of 
the dynastic Kennedy family, a nephew of President John F. Kennedy and son of 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy.  He moved to Chicago to look after the family real 
estate investments in the city especially the Merchandise Mart.  His prior public 
experience consisted of serving as the Chair of the Board of Trustees of the 
University of Illinois, by appointment from Governor Pat Quinn in 2009.  This was 
a position which brought him into considerable contact with the media and with 
opinion leaders in the field of higher education, although he did not have 
significant prominence statewide. 
So, when the campaign began, none of the three major candidates had a 
statewide reputation and image, although each had some recognition and base in 
Chicago.  Only Dan Biss had held elective office when the campaign started.  He 
was the only one who had essentially paid some party and legislative dues and 
had followed the recruitment requirements that had traditionally been the route 
to the top in Illinois and other states with a strong party organization.  Pritzker 
and Kennedy followed the newer route to success requiring the candidate to have 
significant personal or family resources, instead of prior public office, although 
Kennedy had achieved some public profile by virtue of his appointed role as Chair 
of the University of Illinois Board.   
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Pritzker was considered to be the frontrunner from the first and he quickly drew 
criticism from his opponents.  There were various charges and negative stories 
which the other candidates raised against Pritzker in the primary.  One especially 
harsh story was a tape recording of Pritzker talking with now disgraced, 
impeached, and imprisoned former governor, Rod Blagojevich, where they 
discussed the appointment of a successor to U. S. Senator Barack Obama after he 
was elected to the presidency in 2008.  The recording was made by the FBI who 
had a wire-tap on Blagojevich.   In it Pritzker was clearly heard using some less 
than flattering language to discuss some of the prominent African-American 
leaders who were being considered, and he ended by saying that Secretary of 
State, Jesse White, would be the “most presentable”, of those being considered.  
This produced a sensation in the media and charges of racism from Pritzker’s 
opponents and some in the media.  
Pritzker’s campaign fairly effectively counter-balanced these charges of racial bias 
with an emphasis on his long record of philanthropy in Chicago, including the 
establishment of a non-profit which specialized in the care and the daily feeding 
of some eight thousand disadvantaged Chicago school children.  He also pointed 
to the energetic support of his running mate, Juliana Stratton, who was an 
African-American State Representative from Chicago’s South Side and was well 
regarded in Springfield as well in her community.   
After a spirited battle, Pritzker took the primary with a surprisingly strong 
showing.  He won 45.1% of the total vote in the Democratic Primary.  Biss came in 
second at 26.7% and Kennedy a close third with 24.4%.  The also-ran candidates 
got the remaining 3.8%.  Pritzker won a total of one hundred counties while Biss 
won two counties, Champaign and McLean, both of which are home to major 
state universities. Kennedy did not take a single county. (Illinois State Board of 
Elections, March, 2018). See Appendix A.  
Pritzker’s prior record and his running mate probably helped insulate him from 
any significant bleeding away of support in the predominantly black wards in 
Chicago, and the primary results indicated that Pritzker had done well with black 
voters.  None of the negative charges raised against Pritzker by his primary 
opponents seemed to have undercut his strong support from the party base. This 
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hard-fought primary campaign and convincing victory over two significant 
candidates put Pritzker in a strong position for the general election.   
Governor Rauner, on the other hand, had an unexpectedly vigorous challenge and 
weak showing in the primary which then dogged him into the general election.  
His opponent, Jeanne Ives, was a very hard line conservative state representative 
from Wheaton, a Chicago suburb, who had been a harsh critic of the governor.  
She was especially known for her hard right rhetoric and for scorched earth 
tactics in the legislature.  This rigid and confrontational approach led her to be a 
darling of the state’s most conservative media outlets but it did not endear her to 
her colleagues in the General Assembly or to Governor Rauner.  
 Many on the right were especially outraged by the governor’s having signed a bill 
that offered protection for gay people to marry and another which guaranteed 
state subsidy for Medicaid payments for abortions, both of which Ives stridently 
opposed. So, she had a built-in constituency in the Republican Primary, and one 
which empowered her with support from many grassroots conservatives in the 
party.   
All of this worked to the benefit of Ives, the challenger, who took 48.5% of the 
Republican primary vote to 51.5% for Rauner. This unexpectedly strong showing 
for Ives, and weak showing for the incumbent governor, clearly indicated that 
Rauner was in trouble for the general election. Rauner won a total of sixty-three 
counties, well-distributed across the state, while Ives prevailed in thirty-nine 
counties. Rauner won Cook and Lake Counties in Northeastern Illinois and his 
other counties were well-distributed across the state.  Ives, however, took four of 
the five Collar Counties, McHenry, Kane, DuPage and Will, which used to be the 
heartland of the Republican Party.  She also did well in a smattering of counties in 
northern and western Illinois, but the largest number of counties she won was in 
central and southern Illinois.   
These predominantly rural downstate counties are becoming the new base for 
the Republican Party in Illinois.  Ives started with virtually no name recognition 
outside her suburban Chicago legislative district and her campaign was 
dramatically under-funded compared to Rauner’s.  When the votes were counted 
her strong showing, challenging a first-term incumbent governor with lots of 
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advantages and resources, indicated that Rauner had real problems within his 
Republican Party base. See Appendix B. 
 In addition, while Ives begrudgingly conceded defeat, she pointedly refused to 
endorse the governor specifically, although she rather generically said that she 
was a Republican and would support the party ticket.  In this disappointing 
outcome for the governor, the primary results showed that he had been wounded 
by the primary, and by his record of the last four years, and that those wounds 
would be very hard to heal for the general election.   
The General Election 
The general election was fought on what had already become familiar grounds in 
the primary.  Pritzker was accused of being a lackey of Speaker of the House Mike 
Madigan and of having colluded with former governor Rod Blagojevich to sell 
Obama’s U. S. Senate seat. He and his wife also looked bad when a story surfaced 
explaining how the Pritzkers had removed the toilets from a second downtown 
mansion they owned to claim a property tax break on grounds that the building 
was then uninhabitable.  Implicit in these charges, and sometimes explicitly as the 
campaign intensified in the fall and the negative ads took over the air wars, was 
the charge that Pritzker was corrupt (via his connection to Madigan and other 
Cook County politicians) and a racist (via the connection to Blagojevich).  In fact 
Governor Rauner’s first negative attack ads came up in the spring and were 
essentially a rerun of the already familiar recorded replay of Pritzker’s telephone 
conversation with Blagojevich regarding who would be the best candidate to 
appoint to the senate seat. 
Pritzker’s first advertisements also came up early in the spring and featured a 
biographical theme introducing the general public to who the candidate was, how 
his family, especially his mother had influenced him, what he had accomplished as 
a philanthropist, and what issues he planned to advocate for Illinois.  These first 
ads were all positive and were addressed to the fact that Pritzker was the 
challenger, was still unknown to the voters,  and was in effect a blank slate for 
many voters since he had not run for office before, had little state-wide image 
and no public record to defend.   
Soon enough, however, the Pritzker ads also turned negative and trained fire on 
Rauner and his record and his shortcomings as governor.  The critique of the 
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governor’s record was a scathing one, emphasizing that he had presided over a 
government that for two of his four years in office had failed to produce a state 
budget causing grave harm to the operation of the government and especially to 
the state’s social service delivery structure and the state universities and 
community colleges.  This theme of mismanagement of the government was laid 
directly at Rauner’s door steps and was remarkably similar to the points he had 
made against Pat Quinn four years previously. 
There were tens of millions spent early in the race and then a total of well over 
two hundred million dollars spent by these two super rich candidates. This lavish 
spending bought hundreds of hours of air time and millions of printed and posted 
images and word messages sent out from both camps by the time it was all over.  
In the end it was hard to decipher just what difference all the air wars had made.  
Since both candidates could effectively spend as much as they chose, and they 
roughly matched each other in the advertising bought, they probably reached a 
point of diminishing returns in paid and free messages and advertising well before 
the campaign ended.  Since they were roughly equal in the air wars other factors, 
especially party identification and the voters’ feelings about the state of the state 
and who was to blame for the negatives and who had the best possibilities for 
dealing with the very real problems Illinois faced for the future probably drove 
the final election results. However, the money was crucial in carrying the message 
of both candidates.   
The Poll Results 
This race was almost unique in Illinois in that the published public opinion polls 
showed unanimously that Pritzker led by a wide margin from the beginning to the 
end of this race.  There was an early consensus among the pollsters and those 
who follow them closely that Pritzker was highly likely to win. That view never 
changed. The only real question was by how much and whether Rauner could 
close the gap by November 6th. The national rating experts put the Illinois race at 
the top of all their lists of states where the governorship was likely to switch 
parties, and Rauner was rated as the GOP’s most vulnerable governor.   
The Simon poll was conducted the last week of September, five weeks before the 
November 6th election. Among likely voters, 49% statewide said that they 
intended to vote for Pritzker, and 27% said they would vote for Rauner. This poll 
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showed a large 22 percentage point gap between the two candidates with 17% 
undecided.  In the media coverage of the poll the authors stated that it would be 
difficult for Rauner to close a gap that wide. The extent of Rauner’s problem and 
the pervasiveness of Pritzker’s lead is indicated by the following summary taken 
from the press release for the poll.   
Pritzker led in Chicago by 65 percent to 22 percent and the five suburban 
Collar Counties by 53 percent to 23 percent. Pritzker and Rauner were 
essentially tied downstate with Pritzker at 35 percent and Rauner at 34 
percent.  Pritzker enjoyed an 81 percent to 6 percent lead among 
Democrats while Rauner took a 67 percent to 6 percent lead among 
Republican voters.  McCann was taking 7 percent among Republican voters 
while Jackson garnered 6 percent among Republicans (Jackson, Leonard, 
and Shaw, October 2, 2018).    
This was an almost unprecedented lead for a Democratic candidate for governor 
in the Collar Counties and it indicated that Rauner was in grave danger with a 
virtual tie for the two candidates Downstate, a region where the Republicans are 
ordinarily dominant. In addition the Simon poll showed that there was a marked 
gender gap in the returns with women being much more likely to vote for Pritzker 
than male respondents. Male voters favored Pritzker by 45% to 31% whereas 
female voters favored Pritzker by 54% to 22%.  In addition, there was also a clear 
correlation with income wherein the more educated the respondents the more 
probable their vote was to go to Pritzker. Likely voters with the lowest 
educational levels favored Pritzker by a 41 to 32% margin, a nine point lead, but 
those with a college degree preferred Pritzker to Rauner by 53% to 24%, a 29 
point lead.   
The authors did warn that the race was likely to tighten up somewhat since 
Rauner was at that point only garnering two-thirds of the Republican partisans’ 
vote intentions compared to over eighty percent among Democratic partisans in 
their intentions to vote for Pritzker (Jackson, Leonard, and Shaw, October 2, 
2018).  Ordinarily the partisans ultimately “go home” to their chosen party as the 
race nears its end, and the indications are that this also happened with the 




The General Election Results 
As Table 1 indicates, in the final analysis Illinois voters chose the challenger by a 
massive majority of 713,005 votes or 54.5 % to 38.8 %, a 15.7 percentage point 
edge.  This Pritzker victory was much larger than Rauner’s 4% margin over Quinn 
in 2014. (Jackson, 2015; Jackson, 2011).  Pritzker only carried sixteen counties; 
however, the sixteen counties included eight of the ten largest counties in Illinois. 
Most importantly, Pritzker took Cook by a 71.9% to 24.3 % margin and took four 
of the five Collar Counties by a comfortable margin. Of the Collar Counties Rauner 
carried only the exurban Republican strong hold of McHenry by a 10.8 point 
margin. Rauner carried the other 85 counties, and most of downstate, but he only 
carried Sangamon (Springfield), McLean (Bloomington-Normal) and Madison 
(Metro-East St. Louis) among the state’s largest counties (Illinois State Board of 
Elections, December, 2018). See Appendix D.  
Overall these results clearly provided an overwhelming margin of victory for the 
Democratic challenger, J. B. Pritzker.  Illinois repudiated the incumbent in 2014 
and voted for change to a new man and a different party and in 2018 they did the 
same thing in reverse.  In both case the incumbent’s record of governing, or 
failing to govern successfully, was the major brief against him and delivered the 
office to a new incumbent who promised to make the government function again.   
     Table 1  
  2018 Illinois Governor Race by Geographic Region 
Region  Rauner Pritzker Region Total Votes      % of Votes  
Cook County       426,196 1,262,334      1,756,583  38.63 
Collars    523,428     558,394      1,148,366  25.25          
(1) DuPage   168,347          176,556 
(2) Lake    109,287          128,603 
(3) Kane      77,289             81,310 
(4) McHenry          60,646             48,633 
(5) Will              107,859           123,292                                                                        
Downstate     816,127          659,018      1,642,708  36.12 
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Total State             1,765,751         2,479,746      4,547,657  100.0 
Note:  All data taken from Illinois State Board of Elections website.   
The primary results had raised the warning flag for Rauner.  The fact that Ives 
carried thirty-nine counties, four of which were Collar Counties, and took 48.5% 
of the total vote indicated that the governor had real problems within his own 
party.  When Ives then refused to clearly endorse the governor and continued to 
keep up a steady drumbeat of negative comments about him during the general 
election campaign, the governor’s weaknesses and troubles within Republican 
ranks were on full display. In its public face Governor Rauner made a spirited 
campaign of it, spending tens of millions on television and social media and 
traveling the state extensively.  He also mounted a vigorous defense of his record 
although he consistently blamed Speaker Madigan for his inability to get more 
done.  However, it was a record that too many voters had already made up their 
minds about and in the final analysis, Rauner’s campaign was too little, too late to 
overcome his deficits from the previous four years. 
 After the election Rauner revealed to a Chicago television reporter that he had 
actively recruited at least four other people to take his place at the head of the 
ticket offering to drop out in their favor and to help fund their campaign.  One of 
those was the then-Republican nominee for the Attorney General race, which is 
discussed below.  This was an offer which was made in August when the 
campaigns had already been in full swing since the March primaries.  His lack of 
appreciation for the chaos this would have caused in the race, and the grave 
disservice this abdication would have done to the Republican Party was an 
additional mark of his almost total inability to grasp the basic rudiments of state 
politics although he had been governor for almost four years at that time (Miller, 
December 14, 2018).   
 In addition to their losses in the governor’s race, the Republicans also failed to 
win any of the constitutional offices and they lost ground in the General 
Assembly.  Some of the losses the Republican incurred could be attributed to J. B. 
Pritzker running so well at the top of the ticket and to the muscular financial 
strength he brought to the down ballot races.   
Not only did Pritzker spend lavishly on his own campaign, he also subsidized a 
number of other Democrats running for other offices in the state.  He built a 
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network of campaign offices throughout the state that became the center of his 
effort in that county or region and became an asset for other Democrats running 
on his ticket.  In this party network building he took a page from Rauner’s 2014 
playbook and expanded it significantly in 2018.  The fact that Pritzker could self-
fund his governor’s race meant that this freed up the state party, under Speaker 
Madigan, to raise and spend millions of dollars on races for the General Assembly.  
In the final analysis this spreading of the playing field statewide paid handsome 
dividends for the Democratic Party.  
The Democrats’ control of the house expanded to a supermajority of 74 
Democrats compared to 44 Republicans and they controlled the Senate by a 40 to 
19 margin.  Thus, both Speaker Madigan who was the target of thousands of 
attack ads from the Republicans actually saw his margin of control increase as a 
result of the 2018 outcome, and Senate President Cullerton, who stayed out of 
the spotlight, also had their majorities increase.  Illinois entered a new era of 
Unified Government on the back of the blue wave which engulfed most of the 
state on November 6th despite the very mixed outcomes which produced Divided 
Government nationally.   
 The ground war could also be another reason Pritzker and the Democrats won so 
handily. Pritzker established an extensive network of personal campaign 
organizations all across Illinois.  Unlike other Democrats who previously ran for 
governor or statewide office, Pritzker did not concentrate his attentions on Cook 
and the Collar Counties to the exclusion of the others.  He had a far-flung field 
organization at the county level, and he also worked with the local county and city 
party organizations to build up the entire ticket.  The result was a well-integrated 
statewide campaign closely coordinated with Democrats running for legislative 
seats which then produced positive results for the entire party.   
The Attorney General Race 
Among the constitutional offices, the only other real race was for Attorney 
General.  As in many other states the Attorney General position in Illinois is a 
political prize, an office with real powers which provide the holder with statewide 
prominence and it is often a spring board to seeking higher office. The position 
had been held for four terms, sixteen years, by Attorney General Lisa Madigan.  
She had been a high profile and activist Attorney General who made a name for 
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herself by carving out territory in consumer protection, advocacy and protection 
for children and the elderly, and advocacy for women’s rights.   
In the past two election cycles Madigan was mentioned frequently as a very 
obvious possible candidate for governor.  She encouraged that speculation by 
openly toying with the possibility of running in 2014, but in the end pulled back 
from the race.  She was not only prominent in her own right and because of her 
successful record in office, but Madigan was also the daughter of the Speaker of 
the House, Mike Madigan.  Indeed she faced some challenges in carving out an 
image and record independent of his pervasive influence and reputation.  This 
conflation of the two roles and reputations was often cited as a significant factor 
in her decision to pass on the governor’s contest in 2014.  It was therefore 
something of a surprise and even a political shock when she announced that she 
was not going to run for Attorney General again in the 2018 race, and that she 
would withdraw from politics for a time. 
This unexpected opening of a prized office near the top set off a scramble in both 
parties to be Madigan’s replacement.  There were eight candidates in the 
Democratic Primary including State Senator Kwame Raoul, of Chicago and most 
notably former governor, Pat Quinn, who was trying to make a comeback after 
losing to Rauner in 2014. In 2004 Raoul won the Illinois State Senate seat in a 
district including part of the downtown loop and near south side part of Chicago 
being vacated by Barack Obama when Obama was elected to the U. S. Senate.  
Raoul was a serious leader in that part of Chicago and drew some immediate 
comparisons with Obama, comparisons which he encouraged, although he had 
little statewide prominence and presence.   
Raoul was a graduate of DePaul University and the Chicago-Kent College of Law.  
He was the son of Haitian immigrants and thus a first generation American.  Not 
surprisingly he vigorously opposed the Trump Administration’s attempts to 
withhold federal funds to cities, like Chicago, which styled themselves as 
sanctuary cities.  He also opposed many other Trump Administration policies and 
promised to be a persistent critic of the president including filing law suits against 
the enforcement of Trump Administration policies if he became Attorney General.  
Raoul ran on a platform of increased transparency for government agencies and 
providing more funds for and enforcement of the FOIA laws and the Illinois Open 
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Meetings Act.  He also promised increased protections for organized labor and a 
vigorous defense of their rights.  Raoul had been an advocate for children and 
promised more protections for them.   
On the Republican side, the number was smaller, only two candidates, and the 
Republican candidates being not so prominent likely indicated the thinner bench 
strength of the statewide Republican Party. Erika Harold, an attorney in private 
practice in Champaign, was generally considered to be the favorite.  She had 
attained some political notice by running unsuccessfully against Representative 
Rodney Davis in the 2014 Republican Primary for the 13th congressional district. 
She was also famous in her earlier life from being crowned Miss Illinois in 2002 
and Miss America in 2003.  That experience would not have been very relevant 
except for the fact that in her answer to a question from the Miss America 
contest judges she opposed the placement of foster children in a home with same 
sex parents.  Although Harold denied that this answer fairly represented her 
current view this earlier interview was dug up and became a public controversy 
and a problem for Harold in the general election. Harold also took some pains to 
separate herself from President Trump; however, she could not avoid some 
association with Governor Rauner since he contributed significant sums to her 
campaign and she appeared with him during the campaign on several occasions.   
Harold ran on a platform of supporting anti-bullying programs in schools, and a 
promise to root out public corruption.  She proposed to do this with enhanced 
investigatory powers for the Attorney General including the right to empanel a 
statewide Grand Jury and increased subpoena powers.  She also argued that state 
law should be changed to prohibit legislators from appearing as legal 
representatives in property tax appeals cases (which was a shot at Speaker 
Madigan and his private law practice).    
As Table 2 indicates, Raoul won this one handily by 54.7% to 42.7% or a 12 point 
margin in the popular vote.  Raoul fashioned a victory on the Democratic Party’s 
familiar base in the larger cities and suburbs.  He won a total of only 11 counties, 
five  fewer (Kendall, Winnebago, Knox, Peoria, and Fulton) than Pritzker won, but 
the counties Raoul won were most of the large counties that any Democrat needs 
to win statewide.  Most notably, the counties where Raoul was victorious 
included all of the Collar Counties, except for far exurban McHenry.  He 
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compensated for this with a victory in DeKalb County which is the home of 
Northern Illinois University.  Raoul achieved an overwhelming victory in Chicago 
and Cook County by a 72.1% to 25.7% margin. See also Appendix D.            
 
Table 2 
             2018 Illinois Attorney General Race by Geographic Region 
Region  Harold  Raoul                             
 Cook County    452,625  1,268,742   
Collars     539,249     581,434 
(1) DuPage    171,711     184,917 
(2) Lake                 109,916     134,919 
(3) Kane                  80,217                      85,027 
(4) McHenry      61,299                      51,707 
(5) Will     116,106     124,864 
Downstate     952,268     638,150 
Total State  1,944,142  2,488,326    
       
Note:  All data taken from the Illinois State Board of Elections website  
       
Starting with his northeastern Illinois base, Raoul then added Rock Island County, 
in northwestern Illinois, Champaign County in central Illinois, St. Clair County in 
the Metro-East St. Louis area, and Democratic strongholds, Jackson and Alexander 
Counties in southern Illinois (See Appendix D). 
Harold took all the rest and on geography she won a decided victory of 91 
counties. Downstate Harold beat Raoul by 314,118 votes.  She actually won five 
more counties statewide than Governor Rauner did.  If this were a national race 
for the United States Senate, or the Electoral College, Harold would have won in a 
red landslide, as the map in Appendix D shows so graphically.  But, of course, it is 
ultimately people, not geography which counts in statewide elections.  Even on 
the counting of individual voters measure, however, Harold did reasonably well 
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since she won 1,944,142 total votes statewide, which was 178,391 more than 
Rauner won.  This strong showing, in the face of a bad year for Republicans in 
Illinois, means that Harold will continue to be watched as a potential Republican 
candidate for future statewide races.  In a party which seems to not have many 
prominent statewide leaders, and even fewer women or minority leaders Erika 
Harold will undoubtedly be a part of the political mix for the Republicans in the 
near future.   
The 2014 Results Compared to the 2018 Results 
It is useful to compare the 2014 and 2018 statewide results for the governor’s 
race.  This comparison is especially interesting in the case of Bruce Rauner who 
was a candidate in both races; however, he was the challenger in 2014 and the 
incumbent in 2018.  In a fundamental sense, the 2018 election was a referendum 
on Rauner as governor in 2014 just as it had been a referendum on Pat Quinn in 
2014. 
As the research in this series of papers has documented previously, in 2014 
Rauner enjoyed a sweeping victory from the perspective of geography, winning 
101 of the state’s 102 counties (Jackson, January, 2015).  Quinn took only Cook 
County but the fairly narrow margin of less than four percent in the popular vote 
indicated that Quinn, while losing, had done reasonably well in the other big 
counties.  Rauner beat Quinn by a 142,284 total vote margin, i.e. 1,823,627 to 
1,681,343 (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2014). The key to Quinn’s loss was 
that his vote totals slipped in comparison with his first election in 2010 despite 
the advantages of being the incumbent. Support for Quinn actually declined by 
63,876 votes in his 2014 re-election race compared to his 2010 total which was 
his first bid to be re-elected governor in his own right (Jackson, January, 2015, 12). 
Quinn’s mentor, Dan Walker in 1976 was the last Illinois governor who failed to 
gain re-election when he chose to seek a second term, although Walker was 
defeated in the Democratic primary. Of course, in 2018 Bruce Rauner became the 
third name on that list.    
 Quinn took 66% of the two party vote in Cook in 2014, but he had won 69.24% of 
the two party vote in Cook in 2010.   Rauner swept all the rest with 61% in the 
Collar Counties and 64% Downstate.   The results of Quinn’s two races for 
governor showed just how extremely polarized the state of Illinois had become 
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since he carried a total of only four counties in 2010 (Cook, St. Clair, Jackson, and 
Alexander) and only one in 2014.  Rauner’s 2014 victory also showed that a 
Republican can win in Illinois, a reliably blue state in presidential politics, but it 
takes a good candidate, or a wounded Democrat running, or a combination of 
both in 2014 for that to happen.  
 Pritzker’s overwhelming victory in 2018 showed what would happen when a 
strong Democratic candidate could accomplish statewide when he mobilized the 
Democratic base effectively, appealed to the moderates and independents who 
might only lean toward the Democrats, and convinced a modicum of Republicans 
to cross-over to support him.  Pritzker’s victory in 2018 was accomplished with a 
798,403 net vote increase over Pat Quinn’s 2014 loss total.  Rauner, by contrast, 
lost ground in 2018 when he garnered 1,765,752 total votes compared to 
1,823,627, for a net decline of 57,876 votes in four years. Being the incumbent in 
2018 hurt rather than helped Rauner, just as it had done for Quinn in 2014.    
 Pritzker’s victory also showed especially graphically the power of the Collar 
Counties and how deeply the Democratic inroads now extended into suburban 
northeastern Illinois. The suburbs, especially those close in to the city had become 
increasingly diverse and as that trend grew, the fortunes of Democratic 
candidates increased steadily.  This change was also probably due to key voting 
groups, especially suburban women and well-educated voters, both men and 
women, reacting negatively to both Rauner and Donald Trump although suburban 
women voters had been predominantly moderate Republicans up until recently.  
This point will be discussed more extensively in the conclusion.  
These results cannot be good news for the Republicans in the near term in Illinois, 
and they do not bode well for the Republicans nationally in the long term, 
although nationally the Republicans can certainly win again, and win with Trump 
in 2020, if he runs for a second term, given the distribution of his base throughout 
the nation in a pattern that creates a Republican advantage in the electoral 
college. As was the case in 2016 the crucial states will be Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Those are states which traditionally go Democratic in 
presidential elections (except for Ohio which is usually a toss-up), but which 
Trump won in 2016, states which sealed his victory. If he could win all or even 
most of those states again Trump could quite plausibly win again in 2020 with 
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another Electoral College victory coupled with a popular vote loss.  That election’s 
results will largely depend on what the Democrats do in their upcoming 
nominations battle, what strategic plan they adopt, who wins their nomination, 
and the case they make for their candidate’s election.   
The inability to heal the primary wounds and to unite the party to provide an 
enthusiastic base from which to fight the general election was ultimately the key 
to Governor Rauner’s demise.  He needed the right wing of his party in the 
general election since they were newly energized by Jeanne Ives at the state level 
and Donald Trump at the national level although they had never been nearly a 
majority in the Republican Party in Illinois.  Because the Republicans were the 
minority party overall in the state Rauner also needed the more moderate middle 
of the Republican Party, which had historically been the backbone of the state 
party and he needed to add a modicum of support from true Independents and at 
least a small percentage of Democrats to win.  Those were the keys to his 2014 
victory.   
Undoubtedly the governor and his advisers understood this strategic challenge; 
however, they were never able to land on a strategy that would appeal to both 
wings and Rauner’s campaign seemed to vacillate between appealing to first one 
horn and then the other of this dilemma.  Indeed that was the way he had 
governed as well, and his priorities and the people closest to him on his staff 
frequently shifted back and forth between conservative and moderate or 
pragmatic depending on the issue and the circumstances.  This shift in direction 
and changes in personnel at the top often came with head spinning rapidity.  
Nothing was so symptomatic of Rauner’s inability to make up his mind about his 
direction and his basic loyalties as the summer 2017 appointment of several high 
level officials from the very conservative Illinois Policy Institute to his Chief of 
Staff and Chief Spokesperson positions. These new staffers brought in a team 
from their previous employment.  In the brief interlude of one month the Illinois 
Policy Institute team was in and then out replaced by somewhat more pragmatic 
people but the governor’s fundamental commitments were still not completely 
clear (O’Connor, September 17, 2018).   
Rauner’s record in office, included his original strong advocacy for his 
controversial Turnaround Agenda which he later pared down to only four major 
27 
 
objectives which he considered to be the foundation, but the governor also could 
not get the legislature to enact even the pared down proposals.  This policy failure 
coupled with the two year budgetary stalemate and all the damage it caused, and 
bills he had signed and decisions he had made as governor which angered both 
the conservative base in his party while at the same time not systematically giving 
the traditional moderate wing something to be proud of were fatal drags on 
Rauner’s reelection bid. He did not have many loyal friends in the Illinois General 
Assembly, even among the Republican members. He went into the campaign with 
major problems in trying to govern, and a job approval rating that was 
consistently about twenty points underwater. He was never able to conceive and 
execute a consistent strategic plan to overcome the negatives he had 
accumulated over the almost four previous years.   
The Influence of National Politics on State and Local Elections 
Added to all those problems was the failure of the Rauner campaign to deal 
effectively with the ever-present specter of President Trump dominating the 
national scene. Trump’s presence was felt in every high profile race for governor 
and the congress across the country and extended all the way down to the races 
for the state legislature and even county offices.  This challenge for Rauner was 
made more difficult initially by the fact that the governor was running in a state 
that had gone for Hillary Clinton by 55.8% to 38.8%, a healthy 17 point margin in 
2016 and a state where the president’s job approval was also anemic in 2018.  
Trump was definitely an anchor around Rauner’s neck in the general election, and 
he could not seem to decide whether to embrace it or try to toss it off. He 
vacillated in trying to keep a discreet distance and not comment about Trump 
during most of the campaign only to publicly endorse Trump somewhat tepidly 
near the end.   
This eleventh hour conversion to Trump only solidified the potential for Rauner 
suffering the worst of both sides of the conundrum.  Being associated with Trump 
further alienated the moderate and independent voters, and especially the better 
educated women in Cook and the Collar Counties and many of the bigger cities 
Downstate.  It probably helped Rauner carry the rural and smaller counties 
Downstate, where Trump’s base was stronger, but Rauner likely would have 
carried those counties anyway.  More importantly, no candidate can win Illinois 
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with those counties alone, especially while getting clobbered in the suburbs and 
the larger cities.   
The results of the Illinois general election provided a template for many of the 
recent trends in American politics.  While Illinois is a solidly Democratic state in 
presidential politics, it is still a bellwether state overall in terms of demographic 
and economic mega-trends and the polarization that divides the nation so deeply 
(Jackson, 2004; Jackson, January, 2011; Jackson, Leonard and Dietz, 2016). The 
state’s geographical divisions, with the big city of Chicago, and its surrounding and 
heavily populated suburbs are typical of urban America today (Bishop, 2008; 
Gelman, 2008; Levendusky, 2010).  Illinois’s vast geographical expanse of the 
remaining ninety-six counties, contains a diverse economy based traditionally in 
agriculture and evolving now with increasing rapidly in the service sector of the 
economy.  Statewide these geographic divisions contain within them all the socio-
economic, racial, religious, partisan, and ideological divisions that mark the United 
States as we are about to enter the third decade of the 21st Century. 
These divisions were evident well before the 2016 elections; however, they were 
exacerbated as never before by the tenor of the 2018 campaign.  These divisive 
themes were reinforced by the endless negative ads and charges and counter-
charges on television, the social media, and in the content of the candidates’ 
speeches. Donald Trump won in 2016 by playing on a narrative of deepening 
national peril with constant threat from the outside world and decay at home. 
This external threat was most vividly represented by the first promise he made 
when announcing for the presidency which was to build a physical wall between 
the United States and Mexico in order to keep unwanted immigrants out, a 
promise which led to a partial shut-down of the federal government starting at 
the end of 2018 and extending into 2019, the longest in history.   
In 2016 Trump won the presidential election by a divided outcome which featured 
a comfortable electoral margin of 306 to 232 while Hillary Clinton beat him by 
almost three million popular votes.  This was the second time this century when 
this divided outcome marred the presidential election.  Such divided outcomes 
are much more likely in the future as both parties play to their base and then rely 
on trying to hold down the vote for their opponents by mounting the most 
negative campaign possible, hoping to discourage and dispirit the opponent’s 
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base and the small margin of independents and undecided voters who might be 
persuadable.   
Trump’s first two years in office solidified and celebrated this divisiveness and 
boiling level of toxicity in American politics.  He tried to govern as he had 
campaigned, appealing to and depending only on his loyal base. In this he took 
the opposite tack from Rauner’s vacillations back and forth regarding the 
committed base in Illinois.  Trump’s divisive approach made it almost impossible 
for the Republicans to get much done in the making of public policy if it required 
passing laws since the Republicans, although the nominal majority in the 
Congress, were deeply divided internally and hamstrung by the ever-present 
former Tea Party faction which had been re-labeled as the Freedom Caucus.  The 
Republicans’ major accomplishment in the legislative realm was getting the 2017 
tax cuts done and two Supreme Court nominees confirmed after a contentious 
and destructive battle over the second one.  The Republicans had hoped to make 
the tax cuts the center-piece of their 2018 campaign narrative, touting it and its 
benefits in helping stimulate a booming economy as a platform that their 
candidates for the U. S. House, Senate, and down-ballot candidates in governor 
and state legislative races could also stand on.  Trump made no efforts to reach 
out to the Democrats and to those who did not support him in 2016, except to 
hammer them again and again with tweets and insults. 
At the end of the 2018 campaign Trump reverted to his original form and 
launched an intensive personal campaign during the last month when he re-
started the public rallies held in large venues like athletic and entertainment 
stadiums and airport hangars.  The enthusiastic Trump supporters flocked to 
those places to hear their champion sound the familiar attacks on the opposition.  
He used the twin themes of fear of the immigrant caravan and loathing for the 
Democrats over the way they had handled the Kavanaugh hearings and, by 
extension, their alleged assault on American men in general to fire up the base. 
Trump’s ire turned frequently toward the media, who were always there in the 
crowd dutifully recording and reporting every word, with the president frequently 
again belittling individual reporters and their networks by name, and raising his 
then familiar “enemy of the people” refrain against the press.  The now 
dependable responses of “lock her up” and “build the wall” chants coming from 
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the enthusiastic crowd signaled that the loyal base was back in the fold and ready 
to do battle with the enemy. 
Contrary to the well-known aphorism attributed to former Speaker of the House, 
Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neil, all of American politics is no longer local.  In fact one 
could say that almost all politics is now national, driven by the national leaders, 
especially the president and the congressional leaders, the mass media, and the 
competing narratives of all these major actors (Cf. Jacobson, 2018, 165-188).    
The congressional races, the contests for governor and control of the state houses 
and the court houses are all dominated by those national figures and the issues 
they put onto the political agenda. Those stories are now filtered through partisan 
lens which color how most voters will react at the ballot box and which 
candidates will win. The television and social media ads feature the faces and 
names of Nancy Pelosi, Hillary Clinton, Maxine Waters, Chuck Schumer, Mitch 
McConnell, and Donald Trump as surrogates for whatever candidate is being 
attacked.   Those state and local contests play out in the context of a nation that is 
deeply divided by not only partisanship, but also ideology, issues, race, religion, 
geography, class, and gender.   
The realignment of the 1970s through the beginning of the 21st Century was 
driven by these national issues and personalities.  Thus, southern Illinois, for 
example, which was once a bastion of strength for the Democratic Party has 
almost completely realigned to dependable support for Republican candidates 
from the White House to the court house, with only Jackson and Alexander 
Counties as exceptions in the deep south and St. Clair County in the Metro-East 
area.  These transitions in southern Illinois are quite typical of much of the rural 
Midwest, and almost all of the South, as formerly Democratic districts 
transitioned out of the Democratic Party and became the new bedrock for the 
Republican Party. The old “Blue Dog” Democrats who could be elected in rural 
and southern districts, and the liberal to moderate Republicans of the Northeast 
and parts of the Midwest are now almost extinct, and the middle has largely 
disappeared from both parties.   
 While the transition in the opposite direction is not nearly as complete in the 
suburbs, it is well underway and was a key to the Democrats taking control of the 
U. S. House in the 2018 elections.  In Illinois, the five collar counties, and 
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especially DuPage County used to be the backbone of the Republican Party and 
provided most of its leadership echelon.  The suburbs are not as homogeneous as 
much of rural Illinois and as they have become more diverse, Democrats are 
increasingly winning there too as the results of this election demonstrate.   
The national battle to energize the base came home to Illinois in an October 27th 
rally at the Southern Illinois airport located between Murphysboro and 
Carbondale when the president appeared before another cheering crowd 
variously estimated to be between eight and ten thousand strong.  He was in 
town to campaign for Congressman Mike Bost, a two term Republican who was 
fighting a close battle with his Democratic opponent, Brendan Kelly, in a district 
which had been dependably Democratic since World War II until Bost won it in 
the red wave election of 2014.   
After a brief introductory prelude when Trump read dutifully from the 
teleprompter citing the nation’s horror at the mass killings of eleven worshippers 
at the Squirrel Hill Synagogue in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, which had occurred just 
over twenty-four hours earlier, he then went off the script to riff on all the 
familiar attacks directed against those who oppose him. The crowd responded 
with an enthusiastic affirmation of the president’s continuing ability to hit a nerve 
with them.  The Illinois base was back in the fold and charged up to turn out for 
the election which was then only ten days ahead.   
This presidential visit is particularly relevant to this paper on the governor’s race 
in Illinois because it also directly involved Bruce Rauner who was by then locked in 
a desperate last ditch effort to save his lease on the office. After all he was the 
sitting governor of Illinois and had an invitation to attend the Jackson County 
campaign rally.  He rode down from Springfield on his Harley-Davidson 
motorcycle, replete with his Harley colors and multiple lapel pins on his jacket.  
He also had on a “Back the Blue” ball cap instead of the famous “Make America 
Great Again” red ball caps that were the uniform of the day at Trump rallies.   
Rauner was backstage while Trump introduced and then warmly endorsed Mike 
Bost and called him to the stage for a few words. Trump then called out and 
introduced other incumbents, including Rodney Davis from the neighboring 13th 
Congressional District, a race which he ultimately won over a woman challenger, 
Betsey Dirksen Londrigan by 50.4% to 49.6%, an unusually narrow margin.  Trump 
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next introduced Representative Randy Hultgren from the 14th District who was 
fighting for his political life in a district located in the northwestern suburbs of 
Chicago, some three hundred miles away, in a long-time Republican stronghold, 
which was the home of earlier Republican power-houses, former Speaker of the 
House, Denny Hastert and long serving congressman, Henry Hyde.  This is a race 
which Hultgren ultimately lost to an African-American woman, Lauren 
Underwood, who epitomized what happened in many House races where 
Democrats prevailed in purple and even red districts because of the suburban and 
women’s vote.  In spite of Trump’s endorsement, Underwood upset the 
incumbent, Hultgren, by a decisive 52.5% to 47.5% margin.   
After these introductions the President then went on with his speech where 
among other topics he extolled the many good qualities of the Republican 
candidate for governor of California and predicted a victory for him. Trump 
inexplicitly and probably deliberately failed to mention Illinois’s own incumbent 
governor, Bruce Rauner, who had been there behind the scene, but was never 
publically introduced.  It appeared that Trump was exacting revenge for Rauner’s 
earlier reluctance to embrace him and Rauner’s eleventh-hour conversion was 
too little too late to placate the president.    
This incident seemed to be an omen for how the Rauner campaign would finish 
and it seemed emblematic of his failure to win the enthusiastic loyalty of either 
the hard right Jeanne Ives wing of the party or the more pragmatic long time 
dominant wing of more moderate Republicans like Jim Edgar, George Ryan and 
Jim Thompson.   
Conclusion 
Two weeks later when the race had ended and as the results came in, Bruce 
Rauner conceded to J. B. Pritzker less than an hour into the vote count.  The 
Rauner era was over in Illinois and with it the divided government he had brought 
to the state was drawing to a close.  J. B. Pritzker and the Democrats won a 
resounding statewide victory and the ball was then in their court to see whether 
they could govern and what plans they could create and transform into policy 
designed to address the very real problems which have mounted in the State of 
Illinois since the turn of the 21st Century. 
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Trump went back to the White House after his stop-over in southern Illinois only 
to return to Cape Girardeau, Missouri on Monday the day before the election for 
the very last mass rally of the 2018 campaign which was held at 10 p. m. on behalf 
of Josh Hawley who was challenging incumbent Democrat Claire McCaskill.  The 
rally and Trump’s strategic decision to mount a vigorous appeal to the base in 
order to motivate them to turn out in the numbers that the Democrats were 
already showing in the early polls worked in Missouri and North Dakota and most 
other red states and Congressional districts.  However, even in some Senate races 
where Trump had won by large margins in 2016, like Montana and West Virginia, 
where the Republican challengers had the advantage of attacking the Democratic 
incumbents by linking them to their national leaders, the recourse to the base 
was not enough and Jon Tester and Joe Manchin prevailed in those states.  It did 
work in the razor thin victory of Governor Rick Scott over incumbent Democrat, 
Senator Bill Nelson, in the crucial battle-ground state of Florida.  The Senate 
campaign finished finally after the November 27th general election in Mississippi 
with a 53 to 47 Republican majority, a pick-up of two senate seats, which gave the 
Republicans and Trump their most important victory in the 2018 season.   
Then there was the House races and when the smoke had all settled and the last 
ballots were counted, the Democrats picked up a net of 40 seats, while another 
contested seat in North Carolina remained unsettled.  They also took a net gain of 
seven governorships, among them the one in Illinois, 336 state legislative seats, 
and six state legislative bodies flipped from Republican control to Democratic 
control.  The Democrats won the popular vote by 9 percentage nationwide 
according to Nate Silver at FiveThirtyEight.  They claimed victory, but were initially 
drowned out by the President who also proclaimed a famous victory for the 
Republicans based on the Senate results. He then moved on quickly to other 
subjects where the president can dominate the nation’s discourse on any 
particular day and win the twenty-four hour news cycle with a well-aimed tweet.   
However, the president could not avoid the reality of divided government starting 
in January where the Democrats would once again control the House and Nancy 
Pelosi would again be the Speaker.  Many of the Democratic candidates had run 
and won on the pledge to use the power of the Congress to “take care to see that 
the laws are faithfully executed” in the language of the constitution via their 
power to investigate the president and the executive branch. There was much 
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talk about a long list of Trump’s alleged sins of omission and commission that 
various Democrats believed were worthy of investigation by House Committees 
newly under the control of their party. They list included Trump’s tax returns, his 
association, if any, with the Russians before and during the 2016 campaign, his 
alleged violation of the emoluments clause of the constitution via his family 
business and his profiting personally from his position in the office, and 
potentially obstruction of justice charges based on the way he responded to the 
Robert Mueller investigation.   Some of the more radical of the new Democrats in 
Congress had even talked during their campaigns about impeachment, no matter 
how unlikely that was given the Republicans’ solid control of the Senate. While 
the Democratic leaders in congress were reluctant to raise the issue before the 
Mueller investigation was complete, some of the more progressive new members 
of the House were eager to start that discussion.   
The race for the White House was already on as America had to contemplate two 
more years of deep division in the nation and heated conflict among the office-
holders which are the hallmarks of our politics as we head into the 2020 
campaign.  The final moral of this story is that when a candidate is elected to 
high office, like governor or president, they must learn to govern and deliver 
tangible results or the voters will look for someone new in four years.   
      Bibliography 
Bishop, Bill. 2008. The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America is 
Tearing Us Apart.  New York, N. Y.: Houghton-Mifflin Harcourt. 
Bosman, Julie and Monica Davey. July 6, 2017. “Illinois Lawmakers Override 
Budget Veto, Ending Two-Year Stalemate.  
Https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/us/illinois/budget-shutdown. 
Florida, Richard. November 29, 2016.  “How America’s Metro Areas Voted”. City 
Lab. http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016/11/how-americas-metro-areas-voted.   
Gelman, Andrew. 2008. Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why 
Americans Vote the Way They Do.  Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.   
Heatherington, Marc. 2001. “Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite 
Polarization”.  American Political Science Review. 95. (3). 619-631.   
35 
 
Jackson County Democrats, “Meet the Candidates”, Campaign Brochure, 
September, 2018.   
Jackson, John S., Charles Leonard, and John Shaw. October 2, 2018. “Pritzker 
Holds Lead for November Election” Press Release from the Paul Simon Public 
Policy Institute. Carbondale, Illinois: The Paul Simon Institute.   
Jackson, John S., Charles W. Leonard, and Shiloh L. Deitz. 2016. “The Climate of 
Opinion in Illinois 2008-2016: The Roots of Gridlock”. The Simon Review. Paper 
#47. June. Carbondale, Illinois: The Paul Simon Public Policy Institute. Southern 
Illinois University. 
Jackson, John S. 2015. “The 2014 Illinois Governor Race: Quinn vs. Rauner. The 
Simon Review. Paper #40. January. Carbondale, Illinois: The Paul Simon Public 
Policy Institute. Southern Illinois University.   
Jackson, John S. and Charles W. Leonard. 2014. “The Climate of Opinion in Illinois 
2010-2014. The Simon Review. Paper #37. June. Carbondale, Illinois: The Paul 
Simon Public Policy Institute. Southern Illinois University.   
Jackson, John S. 2011. “The 2010 Elections:  Illinois Still Blue Despite the Red 
Wave that Swept the Nation”.  The Simon Review. Paper #23. January, 
Carbondale, Illinois: The Paul Simon Public Policy Institute. Southern Illinois 
University.  
Jackson, John S. and Paul Gottemoller. 2007. “Party Competition in Illinois”. An 
Occasional Paper of the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute. Carbondale, Illinois: 
The Paul Simon Public Policy Institute.  Southern Illinois University.  
Jackson, John S. 2004. “Illinois Politics in the 21st Century: Bellwether, Leading 
Edge, or Lagging Indicator?” An Occasional Paper of the Paul Simon Public Policy 
Institute. Carbondale, Illinois: The Paul Simon Public Policy Institute. Southern 
Illinois University. 
Jacobson, Gary C. 2018. “Congress: Nationalized, Polarized, and Partisan”. In 
Michael Nelson, editor. The Elections of 2018. C. Q. Press, Washington, 165-188. 
Leonard, Marnie. 2017. “Governor Rauner’s Turnaround agenda from a 
Comparative State Policy Context”. The Simon Review. Paper #50. May. 
36 
 
Carbondale, Illinois: The Paul Simon Public Policy Institute. Southern Illinois 
University.  
Levendusky, Matthew. 2009. The Partisan Sort. Chicago, Illinois: The University of 
Chicago Press.   
Madhani, Asmer. November 2, 2018. “Nasty Illinois governor’s race will be most 
expensive in U. S. History”. USA Today. 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/02/  
Meyer, Theodoric Meyer. October 5, 2018. The Worst job in American Politics: 
Why does J. B. Pritzker, or anyone, want to be governor of Illinois?” Politico. 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/amp/story/2018/10/05.   
Miller, Rich. October 1, 2018. “Your Illinois News Radar” Capitol Fax.com.                                       
https://capitolfax.com/2018/10/01/rosYA-NUMVWE-146550034/.  
Miller, Rich. December 2, 2018. “What does Pritzker mean for Illinois Policy 
Institute?” The Southern Illinoisan, A-9. 
Miller, Rich. January 16, 2019. Blown Out”. Capitol Fax.com.  
Miller Rich. December 14, 2018. “Rauner says he tried to drop out of race after 
primary”. https://capitolfax.com/2018/12/14/rauner-says-he-tried-to-drop-out-
of-race-after-primary.  
O’Connor, John. September 17, 2018. “Rauner’s reluctant embrace of Trump a re-
election tightrope”.  Associated Press.   
Sierachi, Benard. 2009. The Impeachment and Removal of Governor Rod 
Blagojevich: A Just Cause. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press.  
White, Jesse. 2015. Handbook of Illinois Government. Springfield, Illinois: Office of 
the Secretary of State. 
White, Jesse. 2013-2104. The Illinois Blue Book. Springfield, Illinois: Office of the 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Governor’s Race Results for Pritzker in 2018
Compared to Presidential Race for Clinton in 2016
Appendix E
Counties Prtizker won in 2018
Clinton lost in 2016
